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Summary: Global companies providing digital services utilise the public services of the countries from which they derive their 
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The present study aims to demonstrate the importance of digital services taxation not only in terms of increasing tax revenue, 
but also in terms of symbolic significance. It is argued that global digital companies should provide a fair contribution, in 
the form of a percentage of the revenue generated from the use of citizens’ data, to those countries from which these data 
are derived. In other words, states should also receive a fair share of the exploitation of what can be considered as the “new 
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digital services include data-driven 
information and communication technology 
services, online platforms and platform-based 
services. in this area, global companies have 
emerged that in many cases have not only 
achieved hegemony in their own markets, but 
which have also grown to become some of the 
largest companies in the world. A common 
feature of these companies is that they owe 
their success to the online environment and 
the ever-increasing significance of data. 
Naturally, the question arises as to what 
extent this success is attributable to the quality 
of data processing, as opposed to the data 
themselves (Colangelo, Maggiolino, 2017); 
however, a joint study by the German and 
French competition authorities found that 
there is a certain amount of data against which 
competitors cannot feasible compete, even if 
they benefit from high quality data processing, 
unless they also have access to a similar 
amount of data (Autorité de la Concurrence, 
Bundeskartellamt, 2016).
Besides Apple, which has also been engaged 
in device manufacturing from the onset, and 
Microsoft, which also produces software, 
the services of the world’s five most valuable 
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companies – Apple, Google, Microsoft, 
Amazon, and Facebook – practically owe their 
existence to the online environment and data 
(Forbes, 2020). Given the notable changes 
brought about to society and the economy 
by these corporations, their significance 
nowadays far exceeds their actual size. today, 
up to 30-40% of advertising is spent online, 
with half to two-thirds of this spending 
ending up in the hands of Google or Facebook 
(Hungarian Advertising Association, 2020). 
each day, the average user spends 58 minutes 
on Facebook and 53 minutes on instagram 
(BroadBand search, 2020; Marketing Land, 
2019), which means that there is increasingly 
fierce competition to capture the attention of 
users and their related data, given that such 
data fuels the revenue-generating advertising 
market. 
despite their huge growth in terms of size, 
global companies offering digital services do 
not necessarily contribute to supporting the 
public burdens they utilise in those countries 
from which they derive their revenue generating 
datasets. instead, transnational corporations 
are established in countries where they are 
able to obtain the largest tax reliefs, thus 
achieving the best tax optimisation and paying 
significantly less tax than their competitors. 
This phenomenon is particularly prevalent 
in the european union, where the above-
mentioned global companies take advantage 
of the slow-moving bureaucratic institutional 
system of the eu and are easily able to reach 
an agreement with the selected Member state, 
given the difficulties associated with proving 
an alleged case of illegal state aid, which is only 
possible after a lengthy court proceeding, if at 
all. 
in this present study, the authors intend 
to demonstrate that the taxation of global 
companies offering digital services is important 
not only in terms of increasing tax revenue, 
but also in terms of symbolic significance. 
However, this symbolic standpoint has the 
practical consequence that the success of 
eu-wide joint action is highly questionable; 
therefore, action at the level of individual 
Member states may be required. 
GlobAl DIGITAl coMPAnIES  
AS cHAMPIonS oF TAx EvASIon
By default, large multinational corporations 
have access to creative tax advice that helps 
them optimise their tax. Based on the 2018 
estimates of the OeCd, the total annual loss 
of government revenue across all countries of 
the world was at least usd 100-240 billion in 
2015, which corresponds to 4-10% of the total 
global corporate income tax revenue (OeCd, 
2020a). One well-known example of a creative 
tax avoidance technique is the “double irish, 
dutch sandwich” arrangement, which involves 
the shifting of revenue from an irish subsidiary 
to a dutch company with no employees, and 
then from this dutch company to an irish-
owned offshore company (tepper, Hearn, 
2019). This circumstance can be attributed to 
the fact that when it comes to global trade, 
competition (for investors) takes place between 
states, as opposed to between companies, 
largely due to such tax reliefs. On the other 
hand, the characteristics of the digital sector 
further facilitate such tax evasion practices. 
Current tax regulations are a hundred years old 
and are therefore based on physical presence; 
thus, they stipulate that physical presence 
should be used to determine which state has 
tax jurisdiction over what company (state 
Audit Office of Hungary, 2020). However, 
due to the specifics of their operations, global 
companies offering digital services are able to 
provide their services in a given country and 
obtain profits from the added value generated 
in that country without having an actual 
physical presence there. Consequently, global 
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companies offering digital services can evade 
their local tax obligations more easily than 
traditional multinational corporations, the 
latter of which have already demonstrated 
great creativity in this area. While domestic 
companies and sMes pay their taxes, global 
companies offering digital services manage 
to avoid paying euR 60 billion in taxes each 
year (tepper, Hearn, 2019). The european 
Commission claims that the tax burden on 
companies offering digital services is around 
half of what traditional companies are required 
to pay, which further increases tensions 
(european Commission, 2018a).
THE SyMbolIc SIGnIFIcAncE  
oF TAxInG THE DIGITAl SEcTor
it is necessary to clarify that the entire modern 
economy is practically digital in the sense that 
there is no longer a single economic sector left 
that is not utilising digital data in one form 
or another (state Audit Office of Hungary, 
2020; iMF, 2018). For this reason, it would 
be useful to specifically talk about digital 
economic activity in the narrow sense, i.e. the 
digital sector. 
The taxation of global companies offering 
digital services is not only justified by the fact 
that certain countries receive significantly 
lower tax revenues from the activities of 
companies providing global and cross-border 
digital services than is justified (state Audit 
Office of Hungary, 2020), but also from a 
symbolic point of view. social existence is 
not possible without taxes, as evidenced by 
the fact that all major social turning points 
in history have also been tax revolutions [see, 
for example, when the French revolutionary 
assembly voted to abolish the privileges of the 
nobility and the clergy and introduced the 
concept of sharing public burdens (Piketty, 
2014)]. As demonstrated below, the taxation 
of the digital sector also represents a similar 
turning point. 
it was in 2017 that the economist 
first described data as the “new oil” (The 
economist, 2017). The economist was 
definitely right about one thing, namely that 
similarly to oil, data need to be extracted and 
processed. Certain analysts believe that the 
very reason popularity was gained by Facebook 
over Myspace and Google over Yahoo! is that 
they were able to produce solutions that were 
more attractive in terms of demand (Boutin, 
Clemens, 2017). 
if data truly are the “new oil”, then of course 
whoever possesses the data has considerable 
power. in this regard, global superpowers 
are pursuing different strategies. On the one 
hand, China essentially considers its data to 
be national strategic assets and adopts total 
government oversight in this area. One the 
other hand, in the us the private sector once 
again dominates with significant market 
concentration (european Commission, 
2020a). However, europe appears to be losing 
in this respect, as evidenced by the fact that 
european data assets are essentially being 
moved to the us and into the hands of global 
companies providing digital services (Chaire 
Castex de Cyberstrategie, 2020). 
such a flow of data into the us would not be 
an issue in itself if sufficient compensation was 
provided for these data. it is worth mentioning 
at this point that in the past oil not only made 
certain companies rich, but also the states 
from which it was extracted. This meant that 
through the taxation of the revenue generated 
using the resources of a country, it could be 
ensured that the nation in question received a 
fair share of the utilisation of its own territorial 
resources. in this regard, the eu has been slow 
to move when it comes to the taxation of global 
companies providing digital services, given 
that this issue has only been raised in recent 
years. it is particularly painful that the eu has 
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been unable to accomplish the introduction 
of a single eu-level digital tax vis-à-vis the 
us (euractiv, 2019a). The fact that the us 
is threatening a trade war (tax Foundation, 
2020a) if large companies providing digital 
services from the states are taxed in europe is 
not a coincidence and is very telling. it should 
be noted that the us has also consistently 
opposed other european regulatory initiatives 
concerning global digital companies (PaRR 
Global, 2020). 
despite global capitalism, every nation 
continues to favour itself. Global capitalism 
is no different from competition in general: 
there are winners and losers. The great 
paradox of global capitalism is that contrary 
to its name, it is very much driven by national 
interests and the winner is also announced at 
the national level. Nations and their interests 
have always been lurking in the background 
of global capitalism, given the importance 
of their historical, linguistic, cultural, and 
legal characteristics, and, furthermore, the 
psychological implications of belonging to a 
nation (egresi, Pongrácz, sziget at el., 2016).
Hegemony can essentially only be 
achieved in world trade by exploiting and 
utilising the resources of other nations. 
While historically this could be achieved 
through war, colonialism, the slave trade or 
– in peacetime – through capital and people, 
nowadays it is achieved through cyber-
attacks or simply the extraction of data, for 
which us data monopolies are exceptionally 
well-suited tools. The fact that in certain 
cases companies and nations are supportive 
toward one another while participating in 
the struggle for hegemony in the form of 
global trade is, of course, not necessarily 
the result of noble national principles but 
due to the concentrated nature of (political/
economic) elites at the national level.1 it is 
not by accident that us data monopolies have 
remained intact for so long. For instance, in 
2012, the Federal trade Commission was 
considering antitrust action against Google 
but ultimately decided to refrain from acting 
due to political reasons, namely because the 
second largest supporter of the campaign for 
the re-election of Barack Obama was none 
other than Google (tepper, Hearn, 2019). 
However, President Trump has also slammed 
the eu for taking decisive (protective) action 
against us data monopolies (Politico, 2019). 
in comparison, it is certainly noteworthy 
that on 20 October 2020 the united states 
Attorney General and the Attorneys General 
of 11 Republican states filed a lawsuit against 
Google under section 2 of the sherman Act, 
according to which they asked the court to 
break up the corporation.2
The european Court of Justice in its 
preliminary ruling adopted in July 2020 
(in which it declared that the framework 
provided by the eu-us Privacy shield is no 
longer a valid mechanism for fulfilling the 
privacy requirements of the eu when personal 
information is transferred from the european 
union to the united states)3 implied the reason 
why the us Government is not opposed to the 
success of us-based global digital companies 
in europe. According to the court, the reason 
is that the level of protection required by the 
General data Protection Regulation of the eu 
(GdPR4) and the eu Charter of Fundamental 
Rights with respect to personal information 
does not have to be satisfied if the data of 
eu data subjects are used in the us in a way 
that violates their rights under eu law (e.g. if 
their data are utilised by the us Government), 
given that they no longer have access to an 
effective protection mechanism.
Consequently, these us-based global digital 
companies further strengthen the hegemony 
of the united states around the world, while 
the data protection regulations and tax policies 
of the eu fail to offer europe any protection 
in this struggle.  
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THE ExPloITATIon oF EUroPE
The flow of european data into the us is not 
surprising given that the eu is the world’s 
most open economy (european Commission, 
2020b). it is particularly painful that these 
european data assets have been lost despite the 
existence of supposedly advanced european 
data protection regulations. This loss places 
the eu in a disadvantageous position in a 
number of areas, such as when competing 
internationally in the development of artificial 
intelligence (Ai). While large corporations in 
the united states invest considerable funds 
into Ai development (the value of North 
American investments ranges from euR 
12.1-18.6 billion), the value of european 
private investment lags far behind in this area, 
totalling only euR 2.4-3.2 billion in 2016 
(european Commission, 2018b).
it appears that the aforementioned ruling 
of the european Court of Justice at the end 
of July 2020 will finally put an end to the 
transfer of european data assets to the us. 
This view is also supported by the reaction 
of Facebook, which announced in september 
2020 that it intends to take legal action against 
the irish data Protection Commission’s 
decision to ban it from transferring data from 
the european union to the united states 
under the mechanism used so far (Reuters, 
2020). However, the european Court of 
Justice’s ruling found the resolution of the 
Commission on the Privacy shield to be 
invalid due to formal reasons, with the 
Court holding that that the Commission 
had unlawfully concluded that the level of 
protection stipulated by the GdPR and the 
eu Charter of Fundamental Rights was also 
applicable to data transferred from the eu to 
the us. However, this ruling does not provide 
any meaningful solution for the future 
protection of european data assets, since it 
specifies eu regulations and protection levels 
as the minimum standards applicable to the 
transfer of data to the us which, as discussed 
below, are inherently insufficient.
For a while the GdPR appeared to represent 
the voice of the eu in the new digital world 
economy, which is characterised by a struggle 
for data. The eu intended to approach the 
subject in a more sympathetic manner and to 
strengthen the individual rights related to the 
precessing of personal information. However, 
it was so successful at this that it acted against 
the development of its own data market, 
which proved to be particularly detrimental 
to its position in the great international race 
to develop and use Ai (tóth, 2019; european 
Commission, 2018b), given that the 
regulatory framework of the GdPR prevents 
the conclusion of data exchange and access 
agreements. This is because pursuant to Article 
4 Paragraph (2) of the GdPR, the sharing of 
data constitutes data processing; therefore, it 
is subject to the conditions specified in Article 
6 Paragraph (1) and the requirements are even 
more stringent if the personal data fall into one 
of the special categories listed under Article 9. 
From the point of view of legal certainty 
and the GdPR, it is more favourable when 
data sharing is subject to statutory provisions, 
mainly because otherwise it may also 
have competition law consequences (anti-
competitive agreements or abuse of dominant 
position as shown by the German Facebook 
decision5). The issue of the GdPR not being 
adequate to promote the flow of data has even 
been discussed in an expert report by the 
Commission in the context of data portability, 
due to the fact that it only serves as a solution 
to the migration of historic data and does not 
facilitate continuous data sharing (Crémer, 
Montjoye, schweitzer, 2019). 
On the other hand, although the GdPR 
explicitly states that natural persons must be 
permitted to exercise control over their own 
personal data, this right to informational 
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self-determination has proven to be easily 
eroded and evaded. Although users must 
accept privacy policies and general terms and 
conditions when using data-driven online 
services, these are often worded in such a 
lengthy and complicated manner that most 
consumers have difficulty understanding them 
or simply do not wish to spend time reading 
them (OeCd, 2016). Certain studies have 
shown that it would take the average user 
more than 200 hours annually to carefully read 
these documents for every online transaction 
they enter into (OeCd, 2016). These findings 
clearly demonstrate that such tools are in 
fact unsuitable for reducing the information 
asymmetry of consumers; therefore, the 
OeCd has called for the introduction of 
actual solutions which protect consumers and 
promote informed decision-making (OeCd, 
2016). Furthermore, the Hungarian National 
Authority for data Protection and Freedom of 
information established in a 2015 resolution 
(NAiH, 2015) that the information provided 
in connection with the consent required for 
complex data processing must be structured 
and easy to understand, which can primarily 
be achieved by using appropriate text layouts. 
The question remains as to whether this is a 
feasible and effective solution to the issues 
outlined above. it seems that the only real 
solution would be the elaboration of data 
protection regulations that target the “left out, 
left behind” business model itself, as this model 
does not give users a choice about whether or 
not their personal data are transferred. 
since the level of data protection provided 
by the eu does not reflect or follow the above 
principles, therefore the compliance with 
these regulation makes only the exploitation 
of european data assets possible. However, 
in addition to reinforcing data protection in 
europe, measures should be taken in the field 
of taxation, which is the subject of this present 
study. 
rEGUlATory rEAr-GUArD AcTIonS 
oF EUroPE AGAInST ExPloITATIon 
The competition existing among nations in 
the global economy as explained above can be 
accurately described by the periphery–semi-
periphery–centre model. in this model, the 
centre is defined by innovation and high value-
added work, the periphery by exploitation by 
and defence (closure) against the centre, while 
the semi-periphery generally seeks to address 
the challenges it encounters by alternating 
between the strategies of openness and closure 
(egresi, K., Pongrácz, A., szigeti, P., takács, P., 
2016). if one wishes to be optimistic it could 
be claimed that the regulations themselves 
represent the eu’s innovative response to 
global digital capitalism (euractiv, 2019b); 
however, in the context of the struggle for 
hegemony, it appears more like a defensive 
reaction that is typical of the periphery.
The eu is not very well-equipped for this 
struggle for hegemony as, unlike the us, it 
lacks linguistic and cultural unity, as well as the 
feeling of belonging to a single nation, which 
drive nation-states in their fight for hegemony. 
Consequently, it is questionable whether it 
will be able to take unified action in regard 
to a symbolic matter like the taxation of us-
based data monopolies. Looking at the issue of 
taxation only, past experience does not fill one 
with confidence. However, it should be noted 
that other areas of the european regulatory 
framework have also brought disappointment 
in the struggle to mitigate the harmful effects 
of the digital sector. Besides data protection 
and taxation, which is the subject of this study, 
competition law must also be mentioned 
where only in 2019 the first substantial eu-
level processes (primarily following the 
example of individual Member states)6 were 
initiated. it is thanks to the approval of the 
european Commission that Google became 
an unavoidable player in online advertising 
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following the acquisition of doubleClick in 
2008 (Autorité de la Concurrence, 2018), as 
this merger enabled it to interlink browsing 
and search data, which the Commission did 
not consider a realistic threat.7 
The fact that the General Court of the 
eu overturned the decision of the european 
Commission, according to which Apple was 
supposed to repay euR 13 billion in unpaid 
taxes to the irish budget due to illegal state aid 
in July 2020, on the ground that it could not be 
proven that the company received preferential 
treatment from the irish government, is a 
significant loss on the taxation front.8  
so far, the eu has attempted to handle the 
issue of digital taxation through the use of 
both a temporary and a long-term solution. 
As regards to the proposal of an eu-wide 
digital tax, on the one hand, the eu intended 
to reduce the risk of fragmentation of the 
single market as a result of the appearance of 
unilateral national measures and, on the other 
hand, it hoped to facilitate the adoption of 
policies that would assist in the resolution of 
the global debate surrounding tax base erosion 
and profit shifting (BePs) by reinforcing the 
commitment of the eu and determining 
the direction its new concepts would take. 
Consequently, the european Commission 
presented a package on a Fair and efficient 
tax system in the eu for the digital single 
Market on 21 March 2018. The interim 
proposal of the Commission envisaged a 
Council directive that would tax revenues 
generated by currently tax-exempt digital 
services such as the sale of online advertising 
space, intermediary activities (activities which 
facilitate the sale of goods and services) and 
the sale of user data. The tax would have 
only applied to companies which reached 
the following threshold: annual worldwide 
revenue exceeding euR 750 million and 
annual eu-wide revenue exceeding euR 50 
million. The Commission proposed a uniform 
3% tax rate which would have applied to 
revenues obtained from the provision of 
digital services if a significant portion of the 
value was generated by users. The proposed 
long-term solution would have defined the 
concept of “significant digital presence” in 
light of the OeCd-BePs initiative, which 
would exist when the taxpayer had no physical 
presence within the territory of a Member 
state; therefore, it would have served as a legal 
basis for taxing companies offering digital 
services. A company would have been liable to 
pay the proposed tax if it met at least one of 
the following criteria in a specific fiscal year: 
its annual revenue exceeded euR 7 million; 
it had more than 100,000 users in a single 
Member state; or it had more than 3000 B2B 
contracts concerning digital services. This way, 
a proportional share of the profits would have 
become taxable in the Member state where the 
company had a taxable digital presence. The 
tax rate applied would have been equivalent to 
the tax rate applied to taxpayers with a physical 
presence in the relevant Member state. This tax 
would have also applied to corporate taxpayers 
that were located in a jurisdiction outside the 
eu if their own state had not entered into a 
double-taxation agreement with the Member 
state where the taxpayer had been determined 
to have a significant digital presence.
in this regard the us is in an advantageous 
position, as the eu is only entitled to adopt a 
resolution regarding tax matters if all Member 
states unanimously agree on its contents. 
Naturally, if states are using tax reliefs as a tool 
in the competition for capital in global trade, 
we should not be surprised that, for instance, 
the concept of a single eu-wide digital 
tax failed due to ireland at the end of 2019 
(euractiv 2019a). The official communication 
stated that the Member states would wait for 
the relevant developments expected to unfold 
within the OeCd by the end of 2020 (Council 
of the european union, 2019). However, we 
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should not have any illusions: the us will not 
support the initiative currently on the table 
in the OeCd as long as its conditions are 
binding; the us would prefer participation 
in the new tax plan to be optional for global 
companies (Bloomberg, 2020). On 15 July 
2020, the european Commission adopted a 
new tax package as part of which it will be 
able to expand the scope of eu rules on tax 
transparency to also include digital platforms, 
with the aim of ensuring that operators which 
generate their revenue by selling products or 
services on such platforms bear a fair share of the 
relevant tax liability (european Commission, 
2020c). According to the new proposal, the 
exchange of data concerning the revenue of 
sellers generated via online platforms would 
become automatic between Member states. 
it is important that the proposal does not 
discuss the above-mentioned issues related 
to digital taxation, given that the eu is still 
waiting on the developments of the OeCd 
in this regard. 
Within the OeCd, the issue of taxing 
the digital sector was integrated into the 
BePs initiative in 2015, which was initially 
launched in 2013 and which was referred 
to earlier. The aim of the OeCd-BePs 
initiative, which encompasses 15 different 
areas of action (including the digital sector) is 
to equip governments with the national and 
international tools required to successfully 
combat tax evasion. The OeCd has proposed 
a two-pillar approach to address the current 
situation (OeCd, 2020b). Pillar One focuses 
on the reallocation of taxing rights (nexus), 
which would predominantly be based on 
sales instead of physical presence. A new 
nexus would be created when a company has 
a permanent and significant presence in the 
economy of a jurisdiction, for example through 
interaction and engagement with consumers. 
in order to avoid its dependence on physical 
presence, the creation of the nexus would be 
determined by a revenue threshold. After it 
has been established that a state is entitled to 
tax a certain non-resident company, the joint 
initiative also proposes a way to calculate 
the share of the profits to be allocated to the 
relevant jurisdiction. Pillar two, which is also 
referred to as the “Global Anti-Base erosion” 
(GloBe) proposal, would include measures 
aimed at mitigating the risks arising from the 
practice of transferring profits into countries 
where multinational companies are subject to 
exceptionally low taxes or no taxes at all. The 
GloBe proposal focuses on ensuring that at 
least a minimum level of tax is paid, aims to 
reduce the incentive to reallocate profits and 
also seeks to restrict the competition between 
different tax jurisdictions.
MEMbEr STATE InITIATIvES For THE 
InTroDUcTIon oF A DIGITAl TAx 
since the future success of eu-wide measures 
is highly questionable, the following Member 
states – on their own initiative (not for the 
first time in relation to the challenges brought 
about by the digital economy9) – have adopted 
or are currently considering adopting the 
short-term proposal of the Commission 
described above (KMPG, 2020). See Table 1.
The above member states have not changed 
the worldwide threshold specified in the eu 
proposal; however, they have obviously tried 
to adjust the domestic threshold to match 
their own size (Council of the european 
union, 2019).
These are therefore the Member states that 
– similarly to the eu proposal – would tax the 
income generated from currently tax-exempt 
digital services such as the sale of online 
advertising space, intermediary activities 
(activities which facilitate the sale of goods 
and services) and the sale of user data. Austria 
is imposing a 5% tax on digital advertising 
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revenue only, effective from 1 January 2020, if 
the worldwide revenue of a company reaches 
euR 750 million and its revenue from online 
advertising activities within Austria reaches 
euR 25 million. 
The us announced that it had launched an 
investigation against all of the above Member 
states and the federal government has already 
proposed a 100% tariff on French goods 
with a total value of usd 2.4 billion (tax 
Foundation, 2020b). 
in Hungary, advertisement tax was 
introduced by Act XXii of 2014 on 
Advertisement tax in 2014 with multiple 
progressive tax rates between 0% and 50%. 
A Commission investigation established in 
2015 that this tax constituted state aid since 
the progressive tax rates differentiated between 
undertakings with high advertising revenues 
and ones with low advertising revenues, 
and provided a selective advantage to small 
enterprises based on their size.10 As a result, 
Hungary replaced the progressive tax rates 
with two fixed rates: a 0% rate applicable 
to the portion of the revenue below HuF 
100 million, and a 5.3% rate, which was 
later increased to 7.5%, applicable to the 
portion above this amount. However, the 
Table 1
Digital taxes in some member states 






belgium proposal 3% EUr 750 million  
from digital services
EUr 5 million  
from digital services
czech republic 2021 5%   
if data sharing and 
advertising revenue is 
higher than  approx. 
EUr 188 thousand, or in 
the case of intermediary 
service providers above 
EUr 200 thousand users
EUr 750 million  
in total
approx. EUr 3.7 million 
from digital services
United Kingdom 1 April 2020 2% GbP 500 million GbP 25 million
France 1 January 2019 
retroactive
3% EUr 750 million  
in total
EUr 25 million
Italy 1 January 2020 3%  
of the portion of the global 
revenue that originates 
from Italy
EUr 750 million  
in total
EUr 5 million  
from digital services
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General Court11 annulled the aforementioned 
Commission decision in 2017, as the Court 
did not find any evidence that the progressive 
structure of the advertisement tax provided a 
selective advantage and thus constituted state 
aid. despite this, Hungary suspended the 
tax until 31 december 2022. The european 
Court of Justice has also commented on this 
Hungarian tax. in its 3 March 2020 ruling,12 
the Court of Justice declared that a piece of 
legislation adopted by a Member state which 
imposed a registration obligation on advertising 
service providers resident in another Member 
state with respect to their advertisement tax 
obligations did not infringe the freedom to 
provide services under Article 56 of the tFeu. 
in contrast, the Court declared that the 
provisions of the legislation which specified 
that service providers resident in a Member 
state other than Hungary which failed to 
comply with their registration obligation 
should receive several consecutive fines within 
a few days, the combined amount of which 
could reach several millions of euros, did 
infringe the freedom to provide services under 
Article 56 of the tFeu. The Court justified 
its decision by stating that the legislation did 
not provide such service providers with the 
opportunity and time needed to fulfil their 
obligations and submit any comments they 
may have had before the resolution stipulating 
the final combined amount of these fines was 
adopted. 
collEcTInG DIGITAl SErvIcES TAx
The collection of digital services tax obviously 
poses a challenge for a state that intends to 
impose such a tax on a taxpayer that does not 
reside in the country. it is, however, exactly 
one of the main features of providing digital 
services that the provider does not need to 
be physically present in a country in order 
to generate revenue there. Therefore, non-
resident taxpayers can evade their obligations 
related to the payment of local revenue-
based taxes easily and without consequences. 
However, the above-mentioned Hungarian 
case may offer some interesting insight in 
this regard. Within the framework of the 
advertisement tax introduced under Act XXii 
of 2014 on Advertisement tax, Hungary 
imposed a tax on revenues generated through 
advertisements published online and required 
the publishers of such advertisements to 
register with the Hungarian tax Authority if 
they were not resident in the country for tax 
purposes or face exorbitant fines. Having failed 
to comply with this registration obligation, 
Google was fined by the Hungarian tax 
Authority, whose decision it appealed against 
before a Hungarian court. it therefore appears 
that it is precisely global companies offering 
digital services that are particularly sensitive to 
ensuring that their reputations are maintained 
(OeCd, 2014); consequently, they cannot 
afford to bypass the domestic legal obligations 
existing in a country just because the country 
in question cannot take action against them 
locally. Although this means that smaller 
digital service providers, especially ones that 
are not resident in the eu, can ignore the tax 
liability, whereas those generating the highest 
revenues cannot. it should be noted that 
the Competition Authority has had similar 
experiences in its competition cases, as seen 
in the case in which Facebook paid the HuF 
1.2 billion fine imposed on it even though it 
did not have a physical presence in Hungary 
(Növekedés.hu, 2020). 
in addition, if an undertaking resident 
in another eu Member state is offering 
digital services to customers in Hungary, the 
collection of the taxes imposed on such an 
undertaking are subject to Council directive 
2010/24/eu concerning mutual assistance 
for the recovery of claims relating to taxes, 
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duties, and other measures. This means that 
through the regulated cooperation between 
the tax authorities of the eu, the tax levied 
in Hungary is collected by the tax authority 
of the eu Member state where the taxpayer 
is resident upon the request of the Hungarian 
tax Authority. 
in addition to the above, the Hungarian 
advertisement tax act provides a further 
guarantee for the collection of the tax. The act 
states [see: section 2 paragraph (2)] that the 
customer ordering the advertisement is liable 
to pay the tax unless the customer is able to 
submit a certificate from the publisher which 
proves that the publisher will pay the tax 
(including the case where the publisher fails 
to provide the customer with such a certificate 
despite a documented request to this effect). 
Further provisions of the advertisement 
tax act also serve as a suitable basis for the 
introduction/expansion of the digital services 
tax in Hungary. The act specifies that those 
publishing online advertisements in Hungary 
are required to notify the Hungarian tax 
Authority (register themselves) via a self-
assessment system about their liability to 
pay digital services tax in Hungary and they 
must submit digital services tax return at the 
end of the fiscal year. in its decision regarding 
the Hungarian case referenced above (Google 
v Hungarian Tax Authority), the european 
Court of Justice declared in March 2020 that 
the provision of the Hungarian advertisement 
tax act which specifies that advertising service 
providers resident in another member state are 
required to register for advertisement tax in 
Hungary is in line with eu law.
in addition to the above, it would be worth 
including an additional guarantee against 
tax evasion in the legislation: if a member 
of company group preparing consolidated 
financial statements provides services subject 
to the tax to a third party but the consideration 
for such services is collected by another legal 
entity within the group, for the purposes of 
this tax, the legal entity providing the taxable 
services should be considered to have received 
the consideration. This provision would act as 
a safeguard to prevent legal entities offering 
services which are subject to the tax (but 
generating revenue from such services via 
another legal entity belonging to the same 
group of company) from evading their digital 
services tax liability.
SUMMAry
The taxation of global companies offering 
digital services is important not only in terms 
of increasing tax revenue, but also in terms 
of symbolic significance. For many years 
traditional multinational corporations have 
been able to use their substantial resources 
to creatively optimise their tax. in the case of 
global companies providing digital services, 
this possibility has been further strengthened 
by the fact that current tax regulations are 
a hundred years old and based on physical 
presence. Consequently, such companies 
are able to generate substantial revenue in 
a country without being physically present 
there, while also evading the payment of 
tax. Although these companies have been 
responsible for bringing about a number of 
important social and economic changes, they 
have failed to make a fair contribution – in the 
form of a percentage of the revenue generated 
from the use of citizens’ data – to the public 
burden in those countries from which they 
have derived their revenue generating datasets. 
The loss of such data assets has affected 
the eu particularly severely, with its open 
economy proving to be completely vulnerable 
to such exploitation. Not even the european 
data protection regulations have been able 
to put an end to the migration of data, the 
most important raw material of the 21st 
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century, from the eu to the us. Meanwhile, 
the eu is trying to recover its money and is 
attempting, for instance, to create its own data 
environment that will allow it to take part in 
the international competition concerning 
artificial intelligence, in relation to which 
the us and China have been leading the way 
for a long time. if we consider data to be the 
“new oil” then continuing with the analogy, 
the issue is not that the data assets are leaving 
certain countries but that the source countries 
are not receiving their fair share of the profits 
generated using these resources. digital 
services tax at least offers a symbolic solution 
to this. The fact that the eu was unable to 
introduce a unified digital services tax against 
the us was, of course, no coincidence. On the 
one hand, its Member states are competing 
with each other for investors and they are 
doing this by offering tax reliefs that only 
serve to further strengthen the position of 
these global companies, thus the introduction 
of such an eu-wide tax is not in the interest 
of all Member states. On the other hand, the 
us is threatening to engage in a trade war 
with european countries that introduce or 
consider introducing such a digital services 
tax, which is yet further proof that companies 
offering digital services from the states have 
become the flagships of us hegemony in the 
21st century. it can confidently be said that 
data drain has taken up residence alongside 
brain and capital drain. in this regard, the eu 
has suffered the fate of periphery countries 
since the only options it has left are the 
defence mechanisms that are typical of the 
periphery. The eu is, in vain, trying to put 
a positive spin on this by proclaiming that its 
regulations are its own form of innovation; 
even if this was the case, these rear-guard 
actions are not particularly successful. The 
eu-wide digital services tax has failed, no 
effective legal tool has been found to combat 
fake news (european Commission, 2018c), 
the GdPR has not meet expectations, and 
the tools of competition law have only 
achieved ambiguous – and sometimes even 
disappointing – results. The real results 
achieved so far have primarily been the 
product of domestic efforts or the cooperation 
of a few Member states, such as in the field of 
consumer protection. Of course, the fact that 
the eu has not been successful in the struggle 
for hegemony is not at all surprising. Without 
a unified identity, language and culture, i.e., 
without a psychological cohesive force, it is 
not even worth entering the battlefield. What 
we are left with is defensive and reactionary 
measures on the level of individual Member 
states. These are the practical consequences 
of the symbolic significance of digital services 
tax. 
in general, taxes often possess a symbolic 
significance. Major social turning points are 
often tax revolutions at the same time (e.g. the 
tax exemption granted to the nobility by the 
so-called ‘Aranybulla’ (the Golden Bull) or the 
Hungarian laws of 1848 about the introduction 
of shared public burdens). The idea of digital 
services tax sends the message that the nations 
concerned also wish to take part in the 
exploitation of the new raw material of the 21st 
century. The european Member states which 
have undertaken to introduce a digital services 
tax even at the risk of a trade war have taken a 
significant symbolic step in addition to smartly 
increasing their tax revenue. Hungary should 
also consider catching up with these countries, 
especially given that Act XXii of 2014 on 
the advertisement tax provides an excellent 
foundation for the introduction/expansion/
revival of the digital services tax in Hungary. 
While according to our current knowledge 
it is impossible to achieve a 100% collection 
rate, steps could be successfully taken against 
the largest technology companies in this 
field, based on the relevant experience of the 
Hungarian authorities.
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Notes
1 Therefore, hegemony is based less on the state 
and more on the 'complex of international social 
relationships which connect the social classes 
of the different countries', which is especially 
apparent from the emergence of a transnational 
capitalist class. see Cox, Robert, W. (1993): 
Gramsci, Hegemony and international Relations: 
An essay in Method. in: stephen Gill (ed.) 
Gramsci, Historical Materialism and international 
Relations. Cambridge, Cambridge university 
Press.
2 department Files Complaint Against Google 




3 For details, see C311/18, Data Protection 
Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Ltd 
eCLi:eu:C:2020:559.
4 Regulation (eu) 2016/679 of the european 
Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 
on the protection of natural persons with regard 
to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing directive 
95/46/eC (General data Protection Regulation), 
OJ L 119, 4/5/2016, p. 1–88. 
5 Bundeskartellamt prohibits Facebook from 




6 For details, see the digital services Act 
initiative, the Commission’s proposal on the 
New Competition tool, the proceedings 
initiated against Amazon, Facebook, and Google 
by the european Commission, which were 
primarily inspired by the ruling of the German 
Competition Authority against Facebook https://
ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/mt/
ip_19_4291;   https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-eu-facebook-antitrust/eu-antitrust-regulators-
raise-more-questions-about-facebooks-online-
marketplace-idusKBN21P22J;   https://www.
ft.com/content/a6183776-1a74-11ea-97df-
cc63de1d73f4; CNBC (2020) Google says it 
will pay some news publishers to license content, 
bowing to regulatory pressure https://www.cnbc.
com/2020/06/25/google-will-pay-some-news-
publishers-to-license-content.html.
7 For details, see COMP/M.4731, Google/Double 
Click, 340., 363.
8 For details, see t-778/16, Ireland v Commission, 
t-892/16, Apple Sales International and Apple 
Operations Europe v Commission.  
9 The consumer protection coordinated action 
among Member states with respect to Airbnb (in 
2018), social media (again in 2018), and in-app 
purchases (in 2014) are other examples related to 
online platforms.
10 For details, see european Commission, sA. 
39235 (2015/C) (ex 2015/NN) state aid – 
Hungary, the advertisement tax introduced by 




11 For details, see t-20/17, Hungary v European 
Commission eCLi:eu:t:2019:448.
12 For details, see C-482/18, Google Ireland Limited 
v National Tax and Customs Authority, Hungary 
eCLi:eu:C:2020:141.
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